

## FA 50 AND THE FORCE MANAGEMENT JOINT FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT

by Spurgeon Moore



Spurgeon Moore

*(Throughout this paper, we'll describe the Joint Force Manager as "he." Of course, the person performing the role of Joint Force Manager could be either male or female. The role might also eventually be missioned to an organization, perhaps Joint Forces Command. For ease of reading we'll also create a new acronym, JFM for Joint Force Manager. —SM)*

**The Military Problem.** The United States will continue to be faced with a broad spectrum of growing and diverse threats in a complicated, dynamic, and uncertain environment. Addressing the threats requires the U.S. to apply a range of capabilities with proficiency and effectiveness. The U.S. military's ability to generate appropriate capabilities to address these threats is limited in large part by the friction and inefficiency of its force management capability. The current approach to force management neither effectively employs our current capabilities, nor promotes the long-term health and well-being of the force. Friction and inefficiency are the result of long-standing organizational, information, and functional barriers to the integration of human and technical assets drawn from across the Joint Force.

For many reasons (resource constraints, technological advances, unknown or unpredictable potential enemies) the evolution of America's way of war has been toward joint interdependent warfare. Each of our armed Services excels in combining an array of technologies and tools in its particular dimensions of the battlespace—land, air, sea, and space. Today, to generate a synergy of effects and create overwhelming dilemmas for our opponents, this same emphasis on combinations extends beyond individual Services to Joint forces fighting in Joint Operations. Therefore, we must develop operational concepts, capabilities, and training programs that are Joint from the outset, rather than afterthought.

The United States is faced with a spectrum of diverse and growing threats in a complicated, dynamic, and uncertain environment. Identifying and addressing these threats requires us to apply a range of capabilities with proficiency and effectiveness. However, the U.S. military's ability to generate the appropriate capabilities for the operational commander is limited, in large part by friction and inefficiency of its current joint force management capability. These friction and inefficiency are the result of long standing organizational, informational and functional barriers to the integration of human and technical assets drawn from across the Services. Reducing these barriers will dramatically increase the effective and efficient creation of operational capabilities.

**The Concept.** The Joint Staff, as the synchronizer of military capabilities, has developed a Force Management Joint Functional Concept (JFC). Force Management JFC describes an evolution from an Industrial Age to an Information Age approach to force

*continued on page 14*



Photo by SrA Stephen J. Otero

Air Force BG Rudy Wright, ACC Director of Intelligence, goes over a portion of a simulated air campaign with Army COL Michael Coss, 10th Mountain Division Director of Operations, at Unified Endeavor '06, a joint exercise conducted by U.S. JFCOM.

## REDISCOVERING OUR ROOTS



MG Stephen Speakes  
Director, Force Development  
Executive Agent for FA50

To an Army officer, the term “Force Management” carries a very specific connotation: it encompasses the many processes by which we organize, man and equip, train, and sustain the force. To others, particularly our Joint colleagues, Force Management has a very different meaning, more akin to what we would call “forces management” or task organization, though on a theater

level. In both cases, Force Managers’ special skills, knowledge, and varied experiences have allowed them to be successful. And as familiar officer developmental models change and mature, so too must our thinking when it concerns providing for the success of officers who make up this functional area. There are three keys that we must strive for in developing our cadre:

- Opportunities throughout the Army, Joint Staff, and DoD;
- A variety of assignments at every echelon; and
- Advancement.

As military professionals, we must optimize our value to the warfighting team by developing and honing our skills in the art of enabling and controlling the effects of rapid and continual change. Think back to your experience as a basic branch officer, when we treasured the opportunities to be assigned with troops and valued those assignments where we had a chance to apply the art of warfare. We must bring the same zeal to our duties as force management functional area professionals, and seek out opportunities to apply our skills as FA 50s in operational, as well as institutional, Army assignments.

*“This week we are executing our vision – putting one of our very best out for a tour with the XVIII Abn. Corps so he can help them transform. He will be of incredible use to the Corps because he understands force modernization and I also think he will benefit immeasurably.”*

As I speak with former brigade, division, and corps commanders, the importance of recent operational experience is the one truism that resonates. Our Army is decisively engaged in a protracted global struggle at many levels, enabling our forces to gain valuable experience in continuous and simultaneous full-spectrum operations. What are your experiences? Do they include a variety of assignments at different echelons? Are you doing all you can to seek opportunities that provide you the best set of experiences? These are only a few points to consider as you work through your career and balance your goals for personal and professional success.

The Army is in a unique situation with GWOT. If we are passionate about providing the best organizational and materiel solutions for the Soldier, we need to then understand how these solutions ultimately are applied in a “dirty boot” environment. Imagine how influential you can be to the warfight and the staff agencies that support it if you can apply recent experience to your work as professional force managers.

I thank you all for your personal and professional commitment to excellence. Your work never goes unnoticed, nor does your passion for the Soldier. See you soon! ○

**The ORACLE is the quarterly newsletter published by the U.S. Army’s FA 50 Proponency Office. Its purpose is to discuss FA 50 specific issues, exchange ideas on how to better the community, and keep us all informed.**

Headquarters Department of the Army  
Office of the Director, Force Development DAPR-FDZ  
FA 50 (Force Management) Proponency Office  
700 Army Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20310-0700

**Please submit all material for publication and comment to Mr. Bob Fleitz at 703.602.3270 or email [robert.fleitz@hqda.army.mil](mailto:robert.fleitz@hqda.army.mil)**

Disclaimer: The information in The ORACLE represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not reflect official Army position, nor does it change or supersede any official Army publications or policy. Questions and comments are welcomed and encouraged. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to The ORACLE and to the author, except where copyright is included.



[www.fa50.army.mil](http://www.fa50.army.mil)

# TRUCK MODULARITY: MAKING WAVES ON LAND

by MAJ Lucius Shuler III



MAJ Lucius Shuler III

Today's Army Reserve tactical wheel-based equipment and units face a challenge—their trucks are aging as their organizational tasks are increasing. Modularity is a general systems concept that describes the degree to which a system can be separated and recombined. It also refers to both the rules that enable (or prohibit) the mixing and matching of components' capabilities.<sup>1</sup>

Modular transformation is the force's most extensive reorganization since WWII. It is through the use and implementation of Army modularity within the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) strategy that the Army Reserve will make its combat and support formations more flexible and self-sustaining—even in war environments. Also, the use of new modular units accommodates the need for units to deploy more easily than existing compartmentalized units.

Our changing environment has forced us to re-examine how we set the force's strategy and tactical wheeled vehicle resources. Modularity is the result of this re-examination. The Modular Area Movement Control Team (MCT) is the first example of the new modular transportation structure. It combines the capabilities of the old port, area, regulating, division, and cargo documentation MCTs into one slightly larger unit. The Modular MCT enables a great reduction of the number of MCTs needed, making force structure and historical mobilization data much easier to manage.

Currently, the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) is working with many other agencies on Force Design Update (FDU) # 06-1, which includes a Modular Transportation

Company (TC CO) proposal that combines a variety of truck company capabilities into a single truck company. Currently, the concept excludes capabilities found in rail, watercraft, and cargo transfer companies.

Most TC companies are designed to provide one specific truck capability if deployed to Theater. It is an Army effort to find new ways of helping sustain Joint Connectivity. The use of Six Sigma methodology will offer a different emphasis in helping the individual unit improve performance, while increasing customer satisfaction. The most important component to achieve success can be demonstrated through Defining, Measuring, Analyzing, Improving, and Controlling (DMAIC), which is the current structure to assist us on our journey of meeting the strategic modularity plan, while yielding an improved process and cost savings to the government.

We are also faced with an effort to combine forces with the Marines on a new class of non-developmental trucks, while modernizing the Army's truck fleet. This recommendation was set forth during the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, and comes with many strategic concerns, the main one being that approximately 20 percent of the Army's tactical wheeled vehicles currently are deployed and will be challenged to still meet requirements stemming from the modularity force

initiatives upon their return to CONUS.<sup>2</sup>

Truck assets often have been viewed as a middle step-child of the defense budget, but now are considered the bread and butter of troop mobility and survivability in Theater. Spending on truck modernization over the past decade was less than \$1 billion a year, vs. over \$60 billion in the annual defense procurement budget. The need to implement the "TWV Strategy" has set a new pace for funding. The President's



*continued on page 16*

## WHY FORCE MANAGEMENT?

by Nicholas L. Cerchio III

*Change requires the Army to remain capable in an environment of technological advancements, internal management variances and a world in turmoil. The management of change is an evolving process that must have focus and methodology to support the Army's vision, imperatives, core competencies and enduring values.*


FM 100-11, para. 1-17.

Many outside our profession feel the military is somehow a “different breed of animal”—a self-contained and self-regulating culture with little or nothing in common with both the general populace or our massive civilian industrial

Management Analyst invariably prompts the question: “What is Force Management?”

Of course I stifle the urge to reply, “It is managing the force!” and instead launch into a lengthy explanation that basically states Force Management is present in every company in the world, from the mom-and-pop grocery on the corner to General Motors. Businesses, governments, and even organized religion all have processes that, when boiled down, are essentially Force Management—organizing the business, keeping it running and coping with change. If we substitute the name of any company for “the Army” in the opening quote of this article, you would have the start of a mission statement applicable to almost any business.

**What is needed.** Looking beyond the façade of history we will see that, wherever there is or was an organization, there were “force managers.” After all, even Attila didn’t just “wing it” all the time. Surely he trusted and delegated authority to someone to implement his decisions on who to hire and fire, where to obtain supplies, how to structure, staff, and train the organization (such as it was) and how to fund it. This is Force Management in its embryonic form. Drawing from our own somewhat more recent military history, GENs Washington, McClellan and McNair are recognized as premiere force managers. As always, one must adjust to the vagaries of business. As Army leaders and America’s



machine. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The way generals run their divisions is in many ways very similar to how corporate executives run their companies. They are all tasked with completing a mission, and they do so by directing and managing their resources.

It is common to be asked by friends, family and even strangers what it is we do for a living. My response that I am a Force

businessmen, we must expand and contract these basics to fit the needs of our specific entities.

Even though the function has in fact always been there, Army Force Management has been refined and formalized over the years. In the early 1970s, it was designated as specialty area Functional Area (FA) 50, Force Development. The 1 March 1974, revision of *DA Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3* lists Operations

*continued on page 5*

*continued from page 4*

and Force Development as one of over 50 branches, primary specialties, basic entry specialties, and advanced entry specialties. The 1 Sept 1977 version of *DA PAM 600-3* assigned each of 46 specialties a distinct numerical code. Operations and Force Development became Specialty Code (SC) 54; this specialty was to change in the next revision (1 Nov 1981) of *DA PAM 600-3* to Operations and Plans, and from it FA 50 would emerge.

On 1 Oct 1984, the Army released its second Officer Personnel Management Study (OPMS II), which recommended as one of its short-term management goals that ODCSPER eliminate specialty codes and establish FAs. It made several additional recommendations with regard to managing FAs, including making MILPERCEN responsible for managing officers to include FA designation, compatibility, and skill attainment through education and assignment.

This study also recommended increasing the number of FAs from nine to fourteen. These changes were documented in the 30 Sept 1986 update to *DA PAM 600-3*, and supporting documents, including *DA Pam 600-3-50*, *FA 50 Force Development*. (See sidebar on page 6 for other principal documents relevant to the growth of FA 50.)

**Our proponency.** The Army's functional proponent for Force Management is the G-3/5/7, formerly called the G-3, before that, DCSOPS. As part of the 2002 reorganization of the Army Staff, the newly renamed G-3 retained its operational requirements and policy functions (FM), and the equipping functions (FD) were assumed by the DCSPRO, now Army G-8. At the same time, the personnel proponency office for FA 50 also moved to the G-8, where it resides today.

The current *DA Pam 600-3* (2005) defines the purpose and features of the FM functional area, describes the unique functions of our FA 50 officers in accomplishing the Army's Title 10 requirements, and enumerates the core capabilities of FA 50 Force Managers: develop the force, generate and project the force, sustain the force, and direct and resource the force. *DA Pam 600-3* also lays out the requirements for designation as an FA 50, the critical developmental assignments necessary for advancement as an FA 50, the advanced civil schooling and fellowship programs available, and typical life-cycle

development and utilization plans for both the active and Reserve component FA 50 officer. On 31 Dec 1999, FA 50 had an initial authorization of 181 officers; that number grew to 210 by 31 Dec 2001. Today, FA 50 authorizations across the Regular Army again total approximately 181.

**FA 50 education.** Recognizing the importance of the force management function, then-Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) GEN Dennis J. Reimer commissioned a Force Management Functional Area Assessment (FAA). The assessment, supported by the 30 June 1993 U.S. Army Force Management Study, recommended establishment of the Army Force Management School (AFMS) as the primary tool for advancing force management education. AFMS taught its first class on 1 Oct 1994; this has become the familiar four-week "How the Army Runs" (HTAR) course, taught several times a year to Army Staff and MACOM action officers, DA civilians, support contractors, and others. Special versions of the HTAR course are also available at AFMS for junior officers, NCOs, civilians, General Officers and Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel, Command Sergeants Major, and others.

The FA 50 Qualification Course is relatively new, consisting of two phases: the four-week HTAR course and an additional 10 weeks in which students concentrate on the details of PPBE, formulation of concepts, doctrine, organizational and materiel requirements, materiel developments, and translation of resources into programs and force structure. The pilot course was taught June 2004, the first full Q-Course in 2005. Plans are being considered now to increase the course to twice a year.

In August 2002, the FA 50 proponency office entered into an agreement with George Mason University that allows FA 50 officers to obtain a Masters in Business Administration (MBA). The first class of six majors began study in August 2002 and graduated in December 2003. A class just recently graduated, and another will start this autumn. ◉

*(Editor's Note: The preceding article is based on a history of FA 50 and Force Management that was prepared for the Army Force Management School.)*

## THE EVOLUTION OF FA 50

- *FM 100-11, Force Integration*. Revised 15 Jan 1995, it became the doctrinal basis for the Army's Title 10 mission to provide a trained, organized, and adequately equipped force capable of prompt and sustained combat operations.
- *AR 11-40, Functional Area Assessment (FAA)*. Published 15 Dec 1995, this was a long overdue revision, critical to proper force management. An FAA allows senior Army leaders to identify and resolve issues that affect execution of HQDA short-range plans and programs. It also provided a teaching mechanism and forum for the horizontal and vertical exchange of information between DA and Major Army Commands (MACOMs), focusing primarily on the Army's ability to maintain readiness, force capability, and force modernization in the program objective memorandum (POM) years.
- Also published in 1995: a revision to *AR 71-11, Total Army Analysis (TAA)*. First issued 1 Nov 1982, this update was long overdue. This regulation prescribed objectives, procedures, and responsibilities for TAA and associated force management activities.
- *AR 71-9 Materiel Requirements*, issued 30 April 1997, established policies and assigned responsibilities for identifying warfighting materiel requirements, and preparing requirements documents to acquire warfighting systems and training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators, and for conducting supporting analyses. *AR 71-9*, supported by *TRADOC Pam 71-9*, have become the Army's basic references for doctrine and combat developments and are being updated to reflect recent implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).
- *OPMS XXI*, now called *OPMS III*, published 9 July 1997, announced the formation of FAs, Career Fields, and the long-awaited single-track officer management system. This study also recommended several new functional areas, chief of which was FA 50, Strategy and Force Development (now Force Management).

This functional area was formed from elements of FA 54 (Operations and Force Development), which was recommended for elimination. FA 50 was placed in the Institutional Support (IS) Career Field.

- In order to keep pace with the rapidly changing dynamics of the modern Army, *FM 100-11, Force Integration*, although only three years old, was revised and reissued on 15 Jan 1998.
- On 15 July 1998, the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) published a memorandum outlining upcoming changes to *DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure*. This memorandum established FA 50 Strategy and Force Management (note that Force Development had been changed here to Force Management) to identify positions and personnel requiring knowledge in core institutional force capabilities. It established the proponent of this functional area as the Combined Arms Command (CAC), Fort Leavenworth.
- The 1 Oct 1998 revision of *DA Pam 600-3* implemented most of the OPMS III recommendations, including the name change for FA 50. It also fixed the number of functional areas at 18 and branches at 25, defined the roles of the four career fields, and made it possible for officers to compete for promotion with other officers of similar training and background. ◉

*(Author's Note: It is curious that, in the 31 March 1999 version of DA Pam 611-21, the section devoted to FA 50 is marked "Rescinded." One can only assume there was a miscommunication between the authors of DA Pam 611-21 and DA Pam 600-3. FA 50 appears in the current on-line version of HRC's DA Pam 611-21, Smartbook.)*

*"We want our FA 50s to have recent operational experience and to have operated at the tactical level to ensure we remain in step with the Soldiers we support." —MG Stephen Speakes*

FA 50S ON THE MOVE • • • • •



- **MG Stephen Speakes** has been designated as Army G-8 and FA 50 Proponent, replacing **LTG David Melcher**, who has been nominated to be the Military Deputy for Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller).
- **BG Charles Anderson** will be replacing **MG Speakes** as Director, Force Development (FD) and FA 50 Executive Agent.
- Farewell to **LTC Dan Monsivais**, who is leaving his post as HRC FA 50 Assignments Officer to join the Joint Staff J-1. **MAJ Brian Halloran** will take Dan's place.
- Congratulations to FA 50's newest class of George Mason University and RAND Fellows. They are: **MAJs David Bernard, William Fitzhugh, Clay Lyle, and James Barnett.**
- **COL Juanita (Janie) Hopkins** is now chief of FDQ.
- **COL Robert "Bo" Dyess** is FORSCOM's new Force Management Division chief.
- **Jim Chapple** has been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. His article on his experiences at George Mason was featured in the last issue of The ORACLE. He serves with the FD's Plans Division (FDP).
- **MAJ Fred Corcoran** is assuming duties as Executive Officer for the Director of Materiel, G-8.



FA 50 ON THE WEB

Download this and past issues of The ORACLE as well as get updates on career management, fellowships, documents, tools, and references.

[www.fa50.army.mil](http://www.fa50.army.mil)

## FROM THE PROPONENT CHIEF

### If we don't write and share...

by LTC Patrick Kirk

FA 50s must write about our profession; if we don't educate the units, staffs, and headquarters we support in our roles, missions, tasks and purpose, others will try to do it for us. In doing so, opinions, perceptions and decisions will be swayed by the input of those who don't know the real value of the functions we provide and the value we bring to the warfighting team. We could find ourselves years from now trying to understand why officers with little force management experience and even less formal training are making decisions about our future role, function and purpose.

Fundamentally it breaks down to this simple choice: either we start writing and capturing our lessons learned about force management and the role of the FA 50 in theater and as part of a warfighting team, or we let amateurs shape our future... It's our choice.

Commissioned officers have a duty to communicate what we know, what we have learned and how those lessons will impact the future. The harsh reality, though, is that fewer and fewer warfighters and leaders have first-hand knowledge of our technical specialty and how the FA 50 needs to be used. We must shape their thinking now through thoughtful and progressive writings on the subject of force management in our professional journals.

An FA 50 officer with experience in force integration and/or force development coupled with experience in a combat theater lets us all down if he or she cannot invest the time to capture that experience in writing. How can we build a legacy if those who have lived the role, performed the tasks and been a key part of an operation idly watch similar mistakes made in successive operations? We can never establish a degree of credibility for the functional area if we allow decisions to be made and doctrine to be built by those who have never worked in force management or applied our skill set in a theater, or as part of a warfighting staff.

I can't stress this enough: if we don't speak for and look after ourselves, ignorance will gladly speak and establish a place for us.

While we might hesitate to write and capture our lessons learned due to personality conflicts or a clash with an unsympathetic

boss, the Army overall is tremendously supportive of officers writing and sharing critical experience. Certainly there are boundaries, and as long as the writing is well reasoned, offers viable solutions, maintains a professional tone, demonstrates the author's professional competence, sticks to a military topic and divorces itself from political criticism, an FA 50 officer should constructively critique how we provide added warfighting capability to the Combatant Commander. It's through this exchange that we grow, get better as a functional area and set the conditions for continued success.

Honest and constructive criticism is what has made us the officers we are today. Tough lessons in leadership and operations at the national training centers, patient NCOs and honest but demanding commanders, forged the character of every one of us. Imagine what we'd be today if those commanders and NCOs didn't share their lessons or their passion for the profession...Even if writing and publishing does carry a level of risk with it, for us not to share knowledge, experience or lessons learned is unconscionable.

Take the time to think and write; provide us your views. Nothing can be more powerful than a community of professionals sharing and growing from each other's experiences; nothing is more empowering than knowing you are building a legacy through your written contributions. There is no greater time in the history of our Army to have the chance to mold the future. The question is, will you...? ◉

Our legacy starts now...the Soldier is our passion; his success is truly our hallmark. *LTC Kirk is the Chief, FA 50 Proponency Office. Write it down and send him a note at [Patrick.kirk@hqda.army.mil](mailto:Patrick.kirk@hqda.army.mil), or call phone him at 703-602-3267.*

---

*Where do you begin to share  
your ideas? Turn to page 9 for  
suggestions on how to make sure  
your story gets heard!*

---

## FORCE MANAGERS HALL OF FAME

*Editor's Note: Last July, a case containing plaques honoring pioneers of Force Development was unveiled in the FD Hallway in the Pentagon. Currently, five force managers have been inducted into the Hall of Fame. The following profile of Hall of Famer LTG Lesley J. McNair is part of The ORACLE's continuing series honoring our FD forefathers.*



**LESLEY J. MCNAIR**  
*Lieutenant General, USA*  
*(1883-1944)*  
*Inducted 2005*

LTG McNair graduated from West Point, after which he served with GEN Pershing in Mexico and, later, in France during WWI. Based on his work in 1937-38 designing what would become the “triangular” infantry division, McNair had developed a reputation as one who understood the importance and critical elements of force development. In 1942, he assumed command of the new Army Ground Forces, which Pres. Roosevelt had established by Executive Order to overhaul the War Department. Under the reorganization, the Army Ground Forces emerged as the service component responsible for developing doctrine and organizing,

training, and establishing requirements for equipping all U.S. ground forces. As commander of Army Ground Forces, McNair immediately set out to develop new organizations with corresponding operational and tactical doctrine that emphasized combined-arms formations and large unit operations. Once satisfied the Army could operate in large bodies, he concentrated on revising training to simulate the conditions the Army was facing in North Africa.

Perhaps McNair’s most significant achievement before his untimely death in July 1944, was to overcome the seemingly innumerable difficulties stemming from the scale of organizing, training, and equipping an Army that had reached a maximum strength of 88 divisions. As much as anyone, McNair created, trained, and launched the Army that led the allied victory in WWII.

It is said that LTG McNair did more than simply train men—he realized that no Army could be fully effective unless it was properly organized, correctly equipped, adequately led, and completely trained. His insistence on these fundamentals, especially realistic training, helped save untold thousands of American lives.

In 1954, Congress promoted him posthumously to the rank of general. LTG McNair also has been honored by the CGSC Hall of Fame at Fort Leavenworth. ◉

## THE NEED TO KNOW

So you are putting pen to paper to share the FA 50 story. Now where do you send your article? The first step would be the Proponency Office, and basic branch and school publications. Lessons learned may be sent to the Center for Army Analysis or the Army Center for Lessons Learned. *Soldiers Magazine*, *Army Reserve*, and other magazines are geared to their respective components. *Parameters* and *Military Review* are journals that are used as references Army-wide. So is the Army website, which features numerous knowledge centers and collaborative sites that contain white papers, overviews, and fact sheets. Got a great idea for a story? Contact The ORACLE and let us know. Remember, when submitting articles for publication, ensure they are first cleared through your security officer and your boss.



## A CAREER PATH PROPOSAL FOR ARMY FORCE MANAGEMENT OFFICERS

by MAJ Brian Robinson



The Army functions of organizing, training, manning, equipping, and supporting forces are as old as the Army itself. However, a cadre of professionally trained officers dedicated solely to those functions is a relatively new concept. Instituted in the late-1990s, the Force Management Career Field (FA 50) is still evolving and developing the training and doctrine that will enable its members to effectively command, articulate, lead, and manage change. Given the program's infancy, we must answer the question: what is the optimum career path for an Army Force Management officer?

The career paths found in the operations career field serve as a sound starting point for developing our own area specific path. The general concept for operations careers calls for an initial assignment as a platoon leader, followed by company command, then command at the battalion and brigade levels. A fraction of these officers will progress to command at the division, corps, and army levels. Interspersed within the command tours are various school and staff assignments. This model, with modifications, can also form the basis of the Force Management career path.

Platoon leader time for the force manager would consist of service as a systems integrator, organizational integrator, force integrator, systems staff officer, or requirements staff officer at the ARSTAF or MACOM level. At first this may seem counterintuitive, since platoon leaders are normally found at the lowest levels of the operating force, whereas the force manager would start at the highest levels. While on the surface it might seem we are starting at the top and working our way down, a closer look reveals the building blocks of force management are found in the generating force. It is here where the newly trained force manager would gain the experience necessary to perform competently in the operating force.

The training this officer would receive to prepare him for "platoon time" is Phase I & II of Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Phase I, the 3+ month core course for non-operations career fields, is conducted at Forts Belvoir, Lee, and Gordon, and at the Naval Postgraduate School. Phase II for the force manager is the FA 50 Qualification Course at Fort Belvoir, with the Advance Force Management Course a prerequisite. The current Army standard requires officers only to complete both phases by the 13th year of commissioned service. If the current OPTempo continues, many officers will find this requirement daunting. Instead, the force management career path should raise the "ILE by the 13th year" standard and link Phases I & II together, concentrated at Fort Belvoir, with the modification of

*Career Path continued on next page*

*Career Path continued from previous page*



attending Phase II first. Attending function training first would allow the force manager to better understand his unique role in Army full-spectrum operations.

FA 50 training would start at a point where it would finish just before the ILE core course starts. A June-August qualification course, followed by an August-December core course, would be best because the fully trained force manager would be positioned to start his initial job at the beginning of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) cycle.

Successful completion of this duty in the generating force would lead to a “company command” tour in the operating force. Serving primarily at the division and corps level, the force manager would now be armed with the training and experience necessary to be effective at this greater level of responsibility, albeit at a lower echelon. He would attend an Azimuth Course *en route* to this assignment to learn the latest trends and terms in this dynamic field. The typical officer would be a senior major or junior lieutenant colonel and would generally follow his “command” tour with another assignment in the generating force. A select few would serve as division and branch chiefs and attend a course *en route* specifically designed for these positions that are on par with battalion and brigade command.

Force managers selected for colonel would serve generally at the ARSTAF/Joint Staff or MACOM levels with an eye towards promotion to one-star and service as chief of a major force management division or program. Conceivably the force manager would be a candidate for the Director of Force Management or Force Development at the two-star level, and Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 as a three-star.

This career path outlines the “typical” progression of a force management officer. There would be numerous exceptions to this path given high OPTEMPO and OPMS revision. It also does not address the career path for our civilian counterparts in CP 26, which has unique career progression challenges. As the functional area continues to mature, we continue to define success in addition to the skills, knowledge, and attributes necessary to achieve it. The operations model is not a perfect fit for FA 50, but it’s a good place to start. ◉

*MAJ Brian Robinson is assigned to Army G-8, Programs, Analysis & Evaluations Directorate.*

## CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON EQUIPPING THE FORCE

*by Stephen Anderson*

The Army Equipping and Reuse Conference (AERC), formerly known as the Army Equipping Conference (AEC), is a semi-annual ARSTAF, Army command, and ASCC-level conference in which the Army's force developers, including a number of ARSTAF FA 50s, convene to discuss how to employ all available equipment in the Army inventory.

Like the previous AECs, AERC 5.0 convened at Fort Belvoir in June to analyze the status of its equipment and weapons systems—who has what, who needs what, and what needs to be rebuilt, reset, replaced, and recapitalized. What these adjustments are going to cost, and what strategic plans will have to be put on hold until we have more hardware or money also were topics of discussion. The ultimate objective of the review process was to use all of our tools, resources, and experience to bring more balance to the equipping equation and to ensure our Soldiers and leaders have the equipment they need to execute their missions when they need it. The conferees considered virtually every asset available to the Army to meet its equipping demands at every operational level. These assets included excess equipment that could be re-used, depot-produced items, as well as newly manufactured, theater-provided, retrograded and left-behind equipment. To get some sense of the level of effort involved, consider that during AERC 3.0 we addressed equipping solutions for 303 LINs; this time we addressed nearly 900.

AERC 5.0 was sponsored by the G-8 as a part of its mission to develop equipping solutions in support of the current and future operations. AERC 5.0 attendees were organized into working groups that analyzed equipment authorizations in Army organizations and elements around the world to match up requirements and available assets. Daily work sessions culminated in a detailed report-out to the Director of Integration, BG Chuck Anderson (just tapped to be the Army's new chief of force development), who worked closely with the functional groups and provided guidance for clarification and immediate action whenever necessary.

The advantage to all of this is that we now have a far better idea of where we stand in light of late-breaking budgetary changes and other emerging issues, and we have a mechanism to make the necessary adjustments. The process provides

an opportunity for the fully integrated logistics and force development communities to identify potential problems associated with equipping, resetting, and recapitalizing retrograded equipment as part of the ARFORGEN deployment support process, and to provide immediate on-the-spot guidance to redeploying Army units in the field regarding disposition of their equipment.



The conference product is a series of automated and integrated fielding plans and reuse, distribution, reset, and retrograde equipment instructions. The plans will be vetted by the Army commands as well as the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to ensure equipment timelines support training and deployment timelines as much as possible and that we're sending the equipment to the right units based on very fluid situations and priorities. Testing the system is as important as the actual product. The briefings are intended to polish the product for its final presentation to the CSA later this summer. ◉

*(When not supporting AERC, Steve Anderson, an SYColeman contractor supporting FDQ, is writing the Army Modernization Plan.)*

## FD AND THE E-RING

“One Ring to rule them all, One Ring to find them, One Ring to bring them all and in the darkness bind them.”  
—J.R.R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*

The E-ring is the outermost ring of the five-ringed Pentagon, the one with the best views and the most senior officers. It is also the nerve center of the strategic level of our nation’s defense. Besides the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Army G-staff and, of course, the director of Force Development, the E-ring houses the 9/11 chapel, numerous historic displays, and the famed G-8 hallway, where a series of framed historical panels shows the evolution of modern Force Development.

Representing the era of the Root Reforms to the Post-Cold War and GWOT, each of the seven panels chronicles the events of its era with concurrent military and diplomatic strategies, innovators in the field, and interesting facts to put our legacy in perspective. Read sequentially, the panels reveal the Force Development story, shedding light on where we have been and where we are going as a functional area, and an Army.

Also on permanent display is the FA 50 Hall of Fame, honoring Force Managers who have made significant and lasting contributions to our Army, in war and peace. The historical panels and the Hall of Fame are the products of much research and work by the FD staff, the Proponent Office, and the Center of Military History.



MAJ Mark Bennett, ASA (FM&C) takes a moment to admire the FA 50 shadowbox, a temporary display paying homage to the Army’s force developers.

To complement the panels, a shadowbox celebrating the FA 50 proponentcy was also recently on display. The box contained a host of FD mementos—including mock badges of FD pioneers, the new and improved Oracle, Rubik’s cubes, and miniatures of vintage vehicles and equipment. ◉

*Can’t make it to the E-ring? The panels will soon be online at the G-8 website at [www.g8.army.mil](http://www.g8.army.mil).*

### Phone Numbers

Chief, FA 50 Proponentcy Office	LTC Patrick Kirk	703.602.3267/DSN 332
FA 50 Assignments Officer (HRC)	LTC Dan Monsivais	703.325.8647/DSN 221
Strategic Comms and Sustainment	Mr. Bob Fleitz	703.602.3270/DSN 332
Structure and Acquisition	Mr. Al Eggerton	703.602.3305/DSN 332
Joint Integration and Education	Mr. Spurgeon Moore	703.602.3277/DSN 332
Doctrine	Mr. Sean Tuomey	703.602.7625/DSN 332
Education, Training & Professional Development	Mr. Ronnie Griffin	703.602.3268/DSN 332
FAX		703.602.3240/7661/DSN 332

[www.fa50.army.mil](http://www.fa50.army.mil)

*continued from cover page*

management, based on an ability to efficiently and effectively integrate organizational, technical, and human assets from across the Joint Force and from its “mission partners” to make the right capabilities available to commanders at the right time and place to fulfill their missions in inherently uncertain environments, across the range of military operations, and all time scales. Joint Force Management in the Information Age is focused on exploiting the net-centric environment to reduce information, organizational and functional barriers. It will significantly improve the overall effectiveness of the Joint Force by making better use of limited human and technical assets, at the same time improving the ability of the Services, Joint Force commanders and senior leadership to execute their stewardship responsibilities.

What is it/How will it work? Joint Force Management is a managerial construct by which leaders will create and make available to the operational commanders the capabilities they need to implement National Defense Strategy. The concept provides a high-level description of the integrated set of policies, processes, and tools that might be required by the joint force manager 15-20 years in the future. The concept depicts how its application in an environment of organizational transparency, robust risk management, reduced information, and functional barriers will result in the best possible combinations of capabilities to meet the competing needs of operational commanders.

In fact, the term “Joint Force Management” encompasses two related facets or elements. As suggested, the JFM draws on organizational, human, and technical assets of the Joint Force (i.e., the Services) and other mission partners (federal, state, and local governments; PVO/NGOs; industry) to satisfy the needs of operational commanders for capabilities, bounded by guidance from the senior leadership. He also provides a feedback loop from the operational commanders back to the Joint force and mission partners. Simultaneously, the JFM oversees the Capability Development process (aka combat developments, JCIDS) to manage the identification, development, and integration of emerging technologies and warfighting concepts and techniques to produce required future capabilities. The Capabilities Development Process, focused through the several Joint Capability Areas (JCA), includes a capability review and risk assessment to identify gaps and overlaps within the capabilities being developed,

and identifies risks to the short-, medium-, and long-term health and well-being of the Joint Force.

### **Joint Force Management Process**


**“Forces Management.”** The senior leadership of the Nation (President, Congress, Secretary of Defense) establishes the position of the United States in determining multinational military objectives; defines limits and assesses risks for the use of military force and other instruments of national power; develops global or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provides the resources for the Joint Force to develop human and technical assets.

The Joint Force Management process, as currently envisioned, will adjudicate requests from the operational commanders for capabilities to execute their missions with the availability of the assets provided by the Joint Force and mission partners. Operational Commanders, as the consumers of capabilities, are the customers of the Joint Force Manager. The JFM, as the assembler of capabilities, is the customer of the Joint Force and its domestic mission partners.

The JFM receives the Operational Commanders’ requests for capabilities, and in turn requests organizational, human and technical assets from the Joint Force and mission partners. He then creates an initial organizational structure tailored to the needs of the commander with an emphasis on easily integrating the capabilities into the operational commander’s existing or future force structure. The JFM also facilitates the contributions of foreign mission partners, and organizes feedback from the operational commanders to the Joint Force and mission partners providing the assets.

**“Capabilities Development.”** Under the Force Management Joint Functional Concept, the JFM also is responsible for coordinating the response to demands for future capabilities from the operational commanders. The Capabilities Development Process will identify, synchronize, and integrate the proper mix of human and technical assets to provide the right capability to the operational commander at the right time and place. Through a process of reviews and risk assessments, the JFM will identify gaps and overlaps among the capabilities being developed and lay out the risks to the short-, medium- and long-term health and well-being of the Joint Force. This process will rely on the successful recursive, adaptive, and

*continued on page 15*



integrated execution of five basic functions: sizing, structuring, sourcing, readiness assessment and reporting, and planning. The process will be bound by doctrinal, policy, and legal requirements and supported by authoritative data drawn from across the Joint Force and mission partners.

This concept is designed to allow the warfighting community to meet unexpected challenges, accomplish tasks in new ways, learn how to accomplish new tasks, and increase the overall agility of the process by which new capabilities are developed. It reduces the information, organizational, and functional barriers by enhancing connectivity and collaboration among the Joint Force and mission partners, senior leadership, and the operational commanders.

**The Future?** Understanding the Force Management Joint Functional Concept is as yet purely conceptual and our Joint mindset is still evolving, it is important that the Army force manager understands the direction our military is

heading. Right away you probably recognize the obvious: what we call “Force Management” and what they call “Force Management” are not exactly the same thing. We, operating from an organizational life-cycle perspective, typically think in terms of force development and force integration—designing and building organizations, synchronizing the processes for equipping and manning them, identifying and allocating resources, etc. In other words, “management of change.” The “Joint Force Manager,” whoever or whatever that will be, works with “capabilities,” identifying and combining the appropriate technologies, organizations and assets provided by the Services, other agencies, allied forces and even NGOs to meet a Combatant Commander’s particular needs.

The importance to FA 50 officers in the future will depend on how well they adapt as the environment continues to change. Developing the Army’s most highly trained technicians of change, utilizing their skills in force development and force integration, into experts in capabilities packaging to support

the Joint and Combatant Commands is absolutely feasible and well within the realm of the possible. The Army's expert in the processing of Operational Needs Statements (ONS) should have no problem with Joint Unit Operational Needs Statements (JUONS). Based on the similarities of responsibilities between the Army Force Management and Joint Force Management, one could argue that the logical candidate to perform the duties of a Joint Force Management Officer is the Army Functional Area 50 Force Manager. That said, all levels of professional military education need to prepare personnel to operate within a joint force management environment. Army Force Management must additionally include the evolving Joint Force Management practices and techniques.

Our core missions will remain to train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders, and to provide relevant and ready land power to the Combatant Commander and the Joint team. The Joint mindset is here and is being addressed in

many forums throughout our ever-transforming Army. It is essential the Army Force Management community and the FA50 begin addressing now how they will play in this evolution. It is incumbent upon each and every FA 50, as well as the leadership of the Functional Area, to look for opportunities to expand their skills, identify new roles, and prove their relevance in our future Army and Joint force. ◉

*Mr. Spurgeon Moore (MPRI) supports the FA 50 Proponency Office as a Senior Joint Integration Analyst responsible for the integration of emerging Joint interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational linkages on Army force management. He is a retired infantry and Special Forces colonel with 31 years active military service with the 101st Airborne, 3d Armored and 3d Infantry divisions, and USAREUR, PERSCOM, Joint and Army staffs. Contact him at [spurgeon.moore@hqda.army.mil](mailto:spurgeon.moore@hqda.army.mil).*

FY 2007 \$6.6 billion commitment for Army Modularity has sparked a paradigm shift in how we must consider restructuring our units, while also keeping refurbished vehicles readily available. This strategy is intended to correct the truck shortage, which has existed for some time due to years of underfunding. Proposed equipment and funding can create a huge factor in risk vs. strategy, and its affect on the Army's plan to transition into the Future Combat Systems (FCS).<sup>3</sup>

Often times, units required to deploy will have trucks in more than one status: left-behind equipment (LBE), stay-behind equipment (SBE), and/or theater purchased equipment (TPE).

A closer look at the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of the vehicle through some form of Decisions Support System (DSS) will help guide decision-makers in their efforts to transform systems while meeting current objectives and providing needed capabilities.

The Army has become more expeditionary as our environment is changing. Truck modularity allows the Army the opportunity to meet these changing needs, while integrating and synchronizing. Shortages in our current truck units require constant cascading of personnel and equipment

throughout the force to sustain viability at a recognizable and effective strength. This will continue through the foreseeable future as long as the current OPTEMPO is maintained.

## References

1. Shilling, M.A., (2000). "Toward a general modular and its application to interim product modularity." *Academy of Management Review*, 25, 312-324.
2. (2006) DoD Appropriations Act, (Public Print) [H.R.2863. PP]. "Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Modernization Strategy."
3. March 16, (2005), Washington, D.C.: GAO, *Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat Systems Challenges and Prospects of Success*, GAO-05-428T. ◉

*MAJ Shuler is assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. He served four and a half years as an FA 50 in the capacity of Transportation Organizational Integrator (TC OI) with the Army Reserve Force Programs Directorate (ARFP). Just prior to the USARC, he commanded a CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) Battalion at Fort Benning. He currently serves in Iraq as an FA 50.*

## FROM THE CAREER MANAGER | FA 50 ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES

**AWG Opportunity.** We are still looking for a volunteer to fill a position at Ft. Meade as a force manager. Officer must apply to the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) directly and can expect to go through a selection process before being accepted. Interested? Go to the AWG website <http://www.awg.army.mil/>.

**TCS.** We have two officers who will be on temporary change of station (TCS) instruction in Jan 07.

- The next set of officers will go in April-June 07 timeframe for Iraq and Afghanistan. If you wish to be considered for one of these opportunities, please let LTC Monsivais know now so you can be programmed and coordination can be made with your organization. Absent of volunteers, officers will be contacted. These are excellent opportunities to exercise your knowledge in force structure.
- The next big officer moves are expected for summer 07; moves will begin in June and end Sep 07.
- You have 12 months to get matters in order for you next developmental move.
- Exceptional family member program (EFMP) status is current for those enrolled.

### Professional Development

- Advanced Civil School—MBA at George Mason University
- Pre-qualify yourself by Sep 06
- Take the GMAT now...score a 500 or better
- 2.5 GPA in undergrad
- Not at risk for promotion
- Timeline supports it/available for assignment
- Notifying LTC Monsivais so your file can be reviewed and checked for strength, risk and availability
- Advanced RAND Fellowship—an excellent opportunity for senior MAJs and junior LTCs

**Boards.** We've completed LTC (Feb 06) and SSC (Apr 06) boards; look for results in July 06 for LTC and the fourth quarter for SSC.

**Where are you serving?** As evidenced by OERs and ORBs, many officers don't often know their paragraph and line number, much less if they are serving in an authorized force management position. Board members need to know if you're serving in your functional area and how well you've performed. DA Pam 600-3 states what positions are Key Developmental (the new term for branch qualifying). Regardless of the term used, the point of serving in force management authorized positions of increased responsibility is what is expected to continued to be the driving force.

**Joint.** What does it mean to be joint when it comes to promotion? U.S. Code states that:

*"...The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall ensure that officer personnel policies of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps concerning promotion, retention, and assignment give appropriate consideration to the performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff."*



LTC Dan Monsivais  
FA 50 Career Manager  
Email [dan.monsivais@hoffman.army.mil](mailto:dan.monsivais@hoffman.army.mil)  
DSN 221.8647 or 703.325.8647